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Article 4

EDWARD V SPARER PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW FELLOWSHIP SYMPOSIUM:
ROAD BLOCKS TO JUSTICE:
CONGRESSIONAL STRIPPING OF
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION*
Eve Caryt
Brooklyn Law Schoors annual Edward V. Sparer Public
Interest Law Fellowship Symposium held on April 5, 2001 was
entitled "Road Blocks to Justice: Congressional Stripping of
Federal Court Jurisdiction." The topic was three pieces of
federal legislation passed in 1996 and signed into law by
President Clinton. These were the Anti-terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 1 the Prison Litigation Reform
Act ("PLRA"), 2 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). 3 Essays on this
legislation by the Symposium panelists, James Liebman, John
Boston, and Lee Gelernt follow this introduction.
AEDPA was designed to place often insurmountable
procedural barriers before prisoners seeking federal court
review of the constitutionality of their imprisonment or death
sentences. It places a one-year time limit from final judgment
4
in state court on filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
* ©2001 Eve Cary. All Rights Reserved.
t J.D., New York University; Professor of criminal law, legal writing,
prisoners' rights, and appellate advocacy at Brooklyn Law School.
' Pub. L No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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limits the number of successive petitions that a prisoner may
file, 5 and restricts the circumstances under which a judgment
of conviction may be overturned. 6 AEDPA also eliminates
judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders and
expands the definition of "aggravated felonies" to permit the
deportation of legal resident aliens who have committed minor
7
crimes long in the past.
PLRA's purpose was to make it more difficult (some
would say impossible) for prisoners to obtain redress in federal
court for constitutionally impermissible conditions of
confinement. The Act, among other provisions, effectively bars
from court indigent prisoners who have previously filed
"frivolous" law suits by imposing prohibitive filing fees;8
dictates the explicit findings that courts must make to remedy
unconstitutional prison conditions; 9 prohibits money damages
for "psychological" harm; 10 and automatically terminates
orders granting relief in prison conditions cases.
Finally, IIRIRA
eliminates judicial review
of
deportation orders in any court, and removes jurisdiction from
all courts to hear any claim by any noncitizen arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any noncitizen. 11
This trio of Acts shares two common features. The most
obvious feature is their applicability only to two vulnerable and
politically powerless groups of people: prisoners and
immigrants. The second is their interference with the historic
role of the federal courts to provide remedies to those whose
constitutional rights have been violated by acts of the other
branches of government. The personal suffering caused by the
inability to obtain an impartial hearing of a claim of injustice is
incalculable. One can only imagine the despair of a death row
inmate who realizes that his right to obtain federal review of
his conviction or sentence has been forfeited by his
5 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
6 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
7 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2001).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2001).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2001).
11 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2001).
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inexperienced (or lazy or drunk or sleeping) lawyer's failure to
meet the abbreviated deadlines or to take the complicated
procedural steps required by AEDPA. Nearly as tragic is the
plight of the immigrant who, after living legally in the Umted
States since infancy, finds that, as a result of a minor crime
committed decades ago, he or she must, by the unreviewable
order of the Attorney General, be separated from family and
friends and deported to a distant, unfamiliar, and probably
poverty-stricken country where they speak a strange tongue.
Even worse than these individual costs, however, is the
lasting damage that AEDPA, PLRA, and ITRIRA do to the
system of separation of powers that has for centuries served so
well to protect the rights of the individual against
governmental overreaching. When so many other countries,
from England to Eastern Europe to South Africa, are realizing
the crucial role that an independent judiciary plays in the
creation and maintenance of a constitutional democracy that
respects human rights, it is iromc that our own Congress is
mampulating federal jurisdiction to cut back on those rights.
Questions that arises naturally are: what purpose was
this legislation designed to serve? What evil was it supposed to
prevent? One answer has been that the federal courts are
flooded with frivolous lawsuits by prisoners and that this tide
must be stemmed. As James iaebman and John Boston
discuss, however, this is simply not the case. Moreover, the
complicated and incomprehensible procedures mandated by
both AEDPA and PLRA have, in fact, increased litigation and
lengthened the time that inmates convicted of capital crimes
remain on death row
New York Times colummst Anthony Lewis, who has
written frequently about jurisdiction-stripping, told of a
German-born woman who immigrated to the Umted States
when she was one-year old and faced deportation because she
had, two decades earlier, pled guilty to pulling another
woman's hair in a squabble over a boyfriend. "What's the
point?" Lewis asked rhetorically "Who would want to bother
prosecuting someone because twenty years before she pled
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guilty on the advice of counsel to a misdemeanor"1 2 There does
not appear to be a satisfying answer.
Massachusetts District Court Judge Nancy Gertner,
speaking at a recent ACLU conference, suggested that the
purpose of jurisdiction-stripping legislation is to curb an
"activist" judiciary She went on to criticize this suggestion by
pointing out that in the areas of immigrants' and prisoners'
rights, the federal courts had not been at all "activist" for
decades. Indeed, she said, "when you look at these areas, the
courts had stripped themselves long before President Clinton
13
did it and long before Congress did it.'
Judge Gertner's explanation for why Congress has
passed such unnecessary and harmful legislation is dispiriting.
She said,
What's happened here is the politics of demonology This is the
demomzmg of the most vulnerable among us and
this happened
when nobody was looking. It wasn't necessary for the workload of
judges, it wasn't necessary to enact this legislation for the fanaticism
of the federal courts. It was pure symbolism. And it is symbolism
which unfortunately has real and substantial
consequences to the
14
human beings who pass in front of us.

A 1998 survey indicates that the members of Congress
who voted to pass AEDPA, PLRA, and IIRIRA may not in fact
have understood their constituents' views. The great majority
of Americans-some 67%-believe that it is more important to
protect the rights of individuals than to follow what the
commumty as a whole wants.' 5 They also believe, however,
that individual rights are adequately protected. 16 Moreover,
the same survey showed that the American public knows very
12 Anthony
Lewis, Remarks at
Contemporary Congressional Limits on Federal
(Mar. 10, 2001).
13 Hon. Nancy Gertner, Remarks at
Contemporary Congressional Limits on Federal
(Mar. 10, 2001).
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Blocking the Courthouse Doors:
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14 Id.
15

American Civil Liberties Union, Defending the Integrity and Restoring
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: A Proposal from the Public Education Department
of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (Mar. 10 2001) (presented at
conference entitled "Blocking the Courthouse Doors: Contemporary Congressional
Limits on Federal Jurisdiction," co-sponsored by Harvard Law School and the ACLU).
16 Id.
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little about the federal courts. 17 Thus, it is not surprising that
this legislation was passed "when no one was looking." But as
DNA evidence has revealed the legal system's unreliability, the
shift in public opinion on the fairness of the death penalty over
the last year has shown that public education can be effective.
Thus, there may be reason to hope that the trend in Congress
may be reversed through the hard work of lawyers like the
Sparer panelists to challenge jurisdiction-stripping legislation
and to increase public awareness that such laws exist and pose
a danger to all of us.
An optimistic note: At the time that the Sparer forum
took place, panelist Lee Gelernt was busy working on the
ACLU's Supreme Court briefs in Calcano-Martinez v.
Immigratin and Naturalizatin Servwce 18 and Immigratin
and Naturalizatin Service v. St. Cyr,19 which challenged
provisions of IIRIRA and AEDPA. Both cases were decided on
June 25, 2001. In Calcano-Martinez,the Court held that while
the federal courts lack the power of direct review over
deportation decisions by the INS, the jursdiction-stripping
provisions of IIRIRA do not apply to habeas corpus petitions. 20
In St. Cyr the Court held that neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA
deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to review the habeas
corpus petitions of immigrants challenging orders for their
deportation. 2 1 The Court also held that the statutory provisions
mandating the automatic deportation of immigrants who had
22
been convicted of particular crimes were not retroactive.

17 Id.
18 121 S. Ct. 2268 (2001).
19 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
20 Calcano-Martinez,121 S. Ct. at 2270.

21 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2278-80, 2283-87.
22
Id. at 2275-78, 2283-84.

